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A B S T R A C T
The present paper proposes and demonstrates a method for assessing strength of evidence when an earwitness
claims to recognize the voice of a speaker who is familiar to them. The method calculates a Bayes factor that
answers the question: What is the probability that the earwitness would claim to recognize the offender as the
suspect if the offender was the suspect versus what is the probability that the earwitness would claim to re-
cognize the offender as the suspect if the offender was not the suspect but some other speaker from the relevant
population? By “claim” we mean a claim made by a cooperative earwitness not a claim made by an earwitness
who is intentionally deceptive. Relevant data are derived from naïve listeners' responses to recordings of familiar
speakers presented in a speaker lineup. The method is demonstrated under recording conditions that broadly
reflect those of a real case.
1. Introduction
The present paper proposes and demonstrates a method for asses-
sing strength of evidence when an earwitness claims to recognize the
voice of a speaker who is familiar to them. We calculate a Bayes factor
that answers the question: What is the probability that the earwitness
would claim to recognize the speaker if the speaker they heard was the
speaker they claimed to recognize, versus what is the probability that
the earwitness would claim to recognize the speaker if the speaker they
heard was actually some other speaker from a specified population? We
only consider this question with respect to claims made by cooperative
earwitnesses and not claims made by earwitnesses who are in-
tentionally deceptive. We calculate Bayes factors for naïve listeners'
recognition of familiar speakers under conditions broadly reflecting
those of a real case. Our aim is not to provide a Bayes factor value with
respect to that particular case, but to present a method that could po-
tentially be used in other cases involving familiar speaker recognition.
Although the speaker the earwitness actually heard is not always an
“offender” and the person the earwitness names is not always a “sus-
pect”, for simplicity we will hereinafter adopt these terms. Hence, using
this terminology, we calculate a Bayes factor that answers the question:
What is the probability that the earwitness would claim to recognize the
offender as the suspect if the offender was the suspect versus what is the
probability that the earwitness would claim to recognize the offender as
the suspect if the offender was not the suspect but some other speaker
from the relevant population? Other terms can be substituted for “of-
fender” and “suspect” as appropriate for the particular case.
1.1. Familiar-speaker recognition and unfamiliar-speaker identification
There is a substantial amount of research literature on speaker re-
cognition and speaker identification by naïve listeners. In this litera-
ture, “speaker recognition” refers to the scenario in which a listener
hears a speaker and claims that the speaker is a person with whom they
are already familiar, and “speaker identification” refers to the scenario
in which a listener hears an unfamiliar speaker then later hears a
speaker and claims that the latter is the same speaker they heard ear-
lier. Reviews of the research literature from the perspective of potential
application in legal contexts can be found in [1–5], and publications
focused on related legal issues include [6–10].
Although the existing research literature may be informative about
speaker recognition and speaker identification in general, little (if any)
research appears to have been conducted under conditions that attempt
to reflect those of actual legal cases, and none appears to have
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addressed the question that a forensic practitioner working in the
likelihood-ratio framework would set out to answer in an actual speaker
recognition case: What is the strength of evidence associated with this
particular earwitness's claim to recognize this particular speaker under
the conditions encountered in this particular case? The method we
propose is intended to answer this question, and is grounded in modern
thinking on forensic inference and statistics as represented by the
likelihood-ratio framework (e.g., [1,5,11–17]).
Likelihood ratios were calculated in Yarmey et al. [18] for non-fa-
miliar-speaker identification, but the conditions of the experiment did
not reflect those of a legal case, calculations were based on data pooled
across two speakers and multiple listeners, and likelihood ratios were
not framed as quantifications of strength of evidence. In Yarmey et al.
[18], the likelihood ratios were not called “likelihood ratios”, but “di-
agnosticity indices”. “Diagnosticity index”, and the variants “diag-
nosticity ratio”, “diagnostisity measure”, and “diagnostisity value” are
terms that appear to be peculiar to the eyewitness research literature
(e.g., [19–21]); Yarmey et al. [18] included both earwitness and eye-
witness experiments. The eyewitness literature appears to be in-
dependent of the broader forensic inference and statistics literature –
we did not find references to the latter in the former. The eyewitness
literature does not appear to treat a likelihood ratio value as a quan-
tification of strength of evidence that a forensic practitioner would
present to a court and that a trier of fact would (in theory) then be able
to use to update their beliefs (an exception to this may be [22]).1
Rose [1] p. 99 proposed the calculation of likelihood ratios based on
listeners' claimed recognitions of familiar speakers and the use of the
resulting likelihood ratio values as quantifications of strength of evi-
dence. The example given in Rose [1] was based on previously pub-
lished data from [26]. The data were 10 listeners' claimed recognitions
of one recording each of 10 familiar speakers and 2 unfamiliar speakers.
The recordings were of telephone transmitted speech. In contrast to the
proposal we make in the present paper to calculate a Bayes factor for a
listener's claimed recognition of a particular speaker, the likelihood
ratio calculations in Rose [1] were based on response data that had
been either pooled across speakers for a single listener or pooled across
both speakers and listeners. We are unable to relate this pooled-data
approach to a question that would be of interest in an actual case – what
would constitute the evidence was not made clear (we discuss this issue
further in §1.3, §2.8, and §4.2).
1.2. A real case scenario
The last author of the present paper was approached to give advice
on how to assess strength of evidence in relation to claimed speaker
recognition in an actual case. Assessing strength of evidence did not go
ahead in that case, but that enquiry inspired the research reported in
the present paper. Details presented here about the case are kept to a
minimum.
A call was made to emergency services, and the call was recorded at
the call center. The call was made using a mobile telephone. The caller
was a female victim who was in the trunk of a parked car when the call
was made. Most of the recording was of sounds made by the victim.
During a short section of the recording, the voices of two males could be
heard in the background. The recording of the male speakers was
mostly unintelligible.
A suspect was identified based on other evidence. Relatives and
friends of the suspect were played the recording and asked: Do you
recognize the voice of either of the male speakers? If yes, who is that
speaker? Some of the listeners claimed to recognize one of the voices as
that of the suspect. The section of the recording for which they claimed
to recognize this speaker was approximately 3 s long.
Advice from forensic speech science practitioners was not sought
until after the procedure described above had been carried out.
1.3. Speaker lineup procedures
The scenario in the original case is one of familiar-speaker re-
cognition, i.e., a listener hears a voice and claims to recognize it as the
voice of a particular speaker they already know. This differs from an
unfamiliar-speaker identification scenario in which a listener, e.g., an
earwitness to a crime hears the voice of a person they do not know, then
later hears the voices of several speakers and is asked whether any of
those speakers are the speaker they heard earlier. Best practice for
unfamiliar-speaker identification involves presenting a speaker lineup
in which the suspect is one of several speakers, and the listener is told
that the person they heard earlier may or may not be in the lineup –
note that the suspect may or may not be the offender. The other
speakers in the lineup, the speakers other than the suspect, are called
“foils”. The foils' voices and the speaking style and conditions under
which the voices are recorded must be such that the suspect's voice does
not stand out – listeners with no prior involvement in the case should
not be able to pick out the voice of the suspect. For an example of a
protocol for conducting unfamiliar-speaker-identification lineups see
Broeders & van Amelsvoort [27]. For an example of a protocol for se-
lection of foil speakers see de Jong-Lendle et al. [28]. Further discussion
of best practices for speaker lineups appears in: Yarmey [3] pp.
126–128; Sherrin [4] pp. 856–859; Morrison et al. [5] §99.960; and
references cited therein. “Showups” in which the listener hears only one
speaker and is asked if the speaker is the same speaker as they heard
earlier have been criticized as suggestive (see [2,4,9,18,29]). Showups
suggest to the earwitness that the police have reason to believe that the
single speaker is the speaker that the earwitness heard earlier –
showups bias the earwitness to think that the suspect is the offender.
A familiar-speaker recognition scenario could involve a true ear-
witness, i.e., the listener is present while the crime is being committed
and recognizes the voice of the offender at that time. There is usually no
recording of the offender, so a forensic voice comparison cannot be
conducted. In such a scenario, the method we propose in the present
paper could potentially be applied post hoc to assess strength of evi-
dence associated with the earwitness's claim to have recognized the
offender while the crime was being committed. Note that the evidence
is the earwitness's claim to have recognized the offender while the
crime was being committed. We use “recognize” with the implication
that the earwitness not only claims that the speaker is familiar to them
but also names the speaker (or otherwise indicates a particular in-
dividual). For the purposes of the present paper, we assume that the
person named by the earwitness then becomes the suspect. Note that
the offender and the suspect may or may not be the same person – that
is the question before the court. The court will make a decision as to
which is more likely to be true (beyond a reasonable doubt or on the
balance of probabilities) assisted by the strength of evidence calculated
for the earwitness's claim to have recognized the offender.
According to the definition given in the previous paragraph, the
original case described in §1.2 is not a true earwitness scenario. The
listeners were played a recording including only two male speakers and
were asked whether they recognized either of the speakers. This is a
form of showup. Given that the listeners were relatives and friends of
the suspect and likely to a priori have a good idea of who it is that the
police wanted them to recognize, the procedure was likely to have in-
duced an expectation bias. The fact that there were two speakers rather
than one is unlikely to have substantially mitigated that bias. The
1 As outsiders working in a different paradigm, a recent debate in the eye-
witness literature about the relative merits of “diagnosticity” versus receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curves (e.g., [23,24]) seems to us to be mis-
placed (scientists working in different paradigms may be concerned with dif-
ferent questions, Kuhn [25]). It may be that the two communities of scientists
can learn from each other, but we will have to be careful not to misunderstand
each other due to apparently similar concepts and vocabulary actually having
different meanings for the different communities.
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method we propose is one that would be preferable to such a showup
procedure. It involves a lineup procedure that requires listeners to listen
to and attempt to recognize the voices on multiple recordings of each of
a larger number of familiar speakers mixed in with some unfamiliar
speakers. If the lineup procedure were used instead of a showup pro-
cedure, the original recording of the offender would be included in the
lineup, and the listener's response to the offender recording in the
lineup would constitute the evidence. If a showup has already been
conducted, the offender recording would not be included in the later
lineup, and the listener's response to the offender recording in the
earlier showup would constitute the evidence.
Understanding what constitutes the evidence is a prerequisite to
being able to calculate a strength of evidence. This fact does not appear
to have been fully appreciated in earlier proposals to calculate like-
lihood ratios based on responses to speaker lineups.
In the original case a recording of the questioned-speaker was
available, so, rather than conduct a speaker lineup, a forensic voice
comparison could potentially have been performed. An empirically-
validated procedure based on relevant data, quantitative measure-
ments, and statistical models, with direct reporting of the likelihood
ratio or Bayes factor output by the model would be much less suscep-
tible to cognitive bias (see, for example, arguments in [30]).
In §2 we describe the speaker lineup procedure as we implemented it
under conditions broadly reflecting those of the original case. The con-
ditions are forensically realistic, but, as a demonstration of the method
rather than an attempt to answer questions specific to the original case, we
did not try to replicate all details of the original case. We did not test the
same listeners. Using the categories defined by Yarmey et al. [31], in the
original case the familiarity of the listeners with the speaker may have
been “high”, whereas in the present research the familiarity of the listeners
with the speakers likely ranged from “low” to “moderate”. The make and
model of car used was not the same as in the original case. The language
spoken was not the same. We do not know whether in the original case the
male speakers were inside or outside the car. For the original case we
would have tested both conditions, but for the demonstration we only
tested speakers inside the car. We have not attempted to replicate the
particular recording system at the emergency call center (such systems
usually save the recordings in a lossy compressed format). We have not
attempted to replicate the particular playback equipment and listening
environment of the original case. The results given in the present paper do
not therefore represent strength of evidence values for the original case.
This was not our intent, our intent was to demonstrate a procedure that
could potentially be used in other familiar-speaker recognition cases.
1.4. Supplementary material
The listening experiment, including the acoustic stimuli, is available
at: https://surveyanyplace.com/s/testauditivo
The anonymized results of the listening experiment and the Matlab
code used to calculate Bayes factors based on those results are available
at [32].
2. Method
2.1. Speakers
Speakers consisted of a total of 23 adult males, 18 who would be
familiar to the listeners plus 5 who would not be known to the listeners.
Of the 18 familiar speakers, 5 were faculty members from the Acoustics
Institute of the Universidad Austral de Chile, and the other 13 were
famous people: Chilean politicians, journalists, and soccer players.
2.2. Recording
A telephone call was established from a mobile telephone (Samsung
Note 4), and the telephone was placed in the trunk of a car (Citroën
Picasso) which was in a parking lot at a time of day when there was
only occasional traffic. The far end of the call was recorded using a
TASCAM Linear PCM Recorder DR-40 acoustically coupled to a landline
telephone inside a sound-insulated box.
Each speaker was recorded separately. The speaker sat in the front
of the car and responded to open questions asked by a female re-
searcher. Audio recordings of the famous people were obtained from
broadcast media, and were played from a loudspeaker (NTI Audio
Talkbox, which is calibrated to 60 dBA SPL at 1m) placed at head
height on a front seat of the car and pointing toward the other front
seat.
The quality of the resulting audio recordings was poor. They had
low signal to noise ratios.
2.3. Stimuli
Six short sections were extracted from each speaker's recording.
Each section was ~3 s long. The sections were manually selected from
within each speaker's recording, with the conditions that they contain
only the speech of the speaker of interest and that they not overlap or
be contiguous with one another. The total number of stimuli was 138 (6
sections× 23 speakers).
2.4. Listeners
Listeners were 31 students from the Acoustics Institute of the
Universidad Austral de Chile. Potential participants were asked not to
participate if they had hearing problems.
2.5. Listening experiment
The listening experiment was presented online via a web browser.
Listeners participated one at a time at a place convenient to them.
Listeners were asked to do the experiment in a quiet place, but no
constrains were placed on the audio playback equipment they used.
Listeners first saw information related to informed consent. If they
agreed to continue, they then saw instructions. No personal identifying
information was collected from the listeners. Listeners could take a rest
at any time and resume later as long as they did not close the browser.
Listeners could abandon the experiment at any time and their responses
would not be submitted – to submit their responses, they had to click
the “submit” button on the final screen of the experiment. Listeners
were asked only to complete the experiment once, and not to discuss it
with other potential participants until after the period for data collec-
tion was complete.
Listeners were presented with one recording section at a time. The
sections were presented in random order. A listener saw a screen with a
play button, and could listen to the section as many times as they
wanted. On the screen there was also a text-entry box, a “continue”
button, and the following instructions: “If you recognize the speaker,
write their given name and surname in the box then press ‘continue’. If
you do not recognize the speaker, leave the box empty and continue to
the next recording.” Prior to the experiment proper, as part of the in-
structions, the listener saw a demonstration of how to respond. The
demonstration used a good-quality recording of a famous female
speaker, former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet.
2.6. Data coding
The raw data consisted of the written response of each listener to
each recording section. The raw data were coded and anonymized by
the first author. Each speaker was given a unique numeric code, and
that code was used in place of the speaker's name. Coding took account
of spelling variants in listeners' responses. For each speaker, a list of
variant spellings of their name was created. Initial lists of variants in-
cluded correct spellings and anticipated misspellings. All responses
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were automatically coded according to the lists of variant spellings.
Responses that contained text that did not appear in the lists were
automatically flagged. The first author then went through the flagged
responses. When a flagged response was due to a variant spelling not
already included in the lists, and the intended name was obvious, the
first author added the new spelling to the appropriate list. All responses
were then immediately automatically recoded using the revised list,
hence any other occurrences of the same variant did not require the first
author's attention. In addition to adding variant spellings for speakers
who actually contributed stimuli, this process also involved adding the
names of speakers who did not contribute stimuli but whom the lis-
teners named in their responses. The anonymized version of the data
was used for all subsequent analysis.
2.7. Statistical analysis
We begin this section by defining symbols. To elucidate via a con-
crete example, we use the name of a famous Chilean poet as the de-
signated speaker (he was not one of the speakers used in the present
research). The observed count of responses in which the speaker was
Pablo Neruda and a particular listener gave the name Pablo Neruda is
c1+. The observed count of responses in which the speaker was Pablo
Neruda but the listener did not give the name Pablo Neruda is c0+. The
observed count of responses in which the speaker was not Pablo Neruda
but the listener gave the name Pablo Neruda is c1−. The observed count
of responses in which the speaker was not Pablo Neruda and the listener
did not give the name Pablo Neruda is c0−. Hence, c1+, c0+, c1−, and
c0−, refer respectively to the counts of “hits”, “misses”, “false alarms”,
and “correct rejections”, see Table 1. The total number of times that the
listener was presented with a recording section of Pablo Neruda is
n+= c1++ c0+. The total number of times that the listener was pre-
sented with a recording section of someone other than Pablo Neruda is
n−= c1−+ c0−. The listener not giving the name Pablo Neruda in-
cludes the listener giving the name of someone else and the listener not
giving any name, i.e., stating that they do not recognize the speaker.
The sets of variables {c1+, c0+, n+} and {c1−, c0−, n−} can be calcu-
lated for any specified combination of a particular listener and a de-
signated speaker. Below we will drop the “+” and “−” subscripts when
the discussion and calculations are relevant irrespective of the set of
variables.
For each speaker who contributed stimuli, a count was made of the
number of responses in which a listener gave that speaker's name when
the stimulus was a recording of that speaker, c1+, and a count was
made of the number of responses in which the same listener gave that
speaker's name when the stimulus was a recording of a different
speaker, c1−. Dividing these counts by, respectively, the number of
opportunities to give a correct response, n+, and the number of op-
portunities to give an incorrect response, n−, see Eq. (1), would provide
proportions that could be used as maximum likelihood estimates of the
probabilities of correct and incorrect responses, θ+ and θ− respec-
tively. Dividing the former by the latter, see Eq. (1), would provide a
likelihood ratio answering the question: What is the probability that the
listener would say the designated speaker's name if the recording they
heard was of that speaker, versus what is the probability that the lis-
tener would say the designated speaker's name if the recording they
heard was of some other speaker from the relevant population? The
other speakers who contributed stimuli were intended to represent the
population of adult male Chilean Spanish speakers.
= =+ ++( )( )LR
c
n
c
n
1
1 (1)
A problem occurs when there is a zero count in either the numerator
or denominator, as this would give an estimated likelihood ratio of
either zero or infinity. Even with non-zero counts, when n is small the
proportion c1/n may be a poor estimate of the probability for the po-
pulation. To resolve this problem we will apply a Bayesian analysis;
thus we will calculate Bayes factors rather than likelihood ratios.2
For the Bayesian analysis, we use a beta-binomial model (see, for
example, [34] §3.3). The likelihood of the observed count, c1, is given
by the binomial distribution Bin(c1|θ, n). The conjugate prior is given
by the beta distribution Beta(θ|a, b), in which a and b are hyperpara-
meters. Via Bayes' Theorem, the posterior distribution for θ is propor-
tional to the likelihood multiplied by the prior distribution. The pos-
terior distribution is therefore proportional to a beta distribution for
which the posterior parameter values are the sums of the counts and the
hyperparameter values, see Eq. (2) (for simplicity we have dropped
constants that do not depend on θ, and thus use “proportional to” rather
than “equals”).
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The expected value for the posterior distribution, i.e., the posterior
mean, , is given in Eq. (3), in which m= a+ b.
= + + = ++ + + = ++c a c b d c ac a c b c an mBeta( | , )0 1 1 0 11 0 1 (3)
Independently calculating the posterior mean for the numerator and
the denominator, we can then calculate the Bayes factor as in Eq. (4).
= =+ ++++
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Given the small amount of data in the numerator (n+=6), the
results will be sensitive to the choice of prior. To reduce the potential
for cognitive bias, one should specify ones priors before examining the
data and not subsequently change one's choice of priors. We choose to
use Jeffreys reference priors, [35–38], which for the beta distribution
has hyperparameter values of a+=0.5 and b+=0.5 (hence m+=1).
Jeffreys reference priors have been proposed as “non-informative” or
“objective” priors. Irrespective of arguments as to whether these or any
other priors are actually non-informative or objective, Jeffreys re-
ference priors are widely used in Bayesian statistics and thus are ar-
guably generally accepted.
Table 1
Matrix of relationships of variables to stimulus-response pairs. Each variable in
the table refers to a count. The name of any designated speaker can be sub-
stituted for “Pablo Neruda”.
Name given by listener
Pablo
Neruda
No name or a
name other
that
Pablo Neruda
Total
Actual speaker Pablo Neruda c1+
Hit
c0+
Miss
n+
Someone other than
Pablo Neruda
c1−
False alarm
c0−
Correct
rejection
n−
2 Readers unfamiliar with the difference between likelihood ratios and Bayes
factors and looking for a brief non-polemical introduction may wish to consult
Etz [33]. The relative merits of the use of likelihood ratios and Bayes factors in
quantifying strength of evidence have recently been debated in the forensic
inference and statistics literature, including in a recent virtual special issue in
Science & Justice: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/science-and-justice/
special-issue/102F0FGVD03
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Whereas in the numerator n+=6 is the count of 6 stimuli from 1
speaker, in the denominator n−=132 is the count of 6 stimuli from
each of 22 speakers. The prior we use for the denominator is equivalent
to one Jeffreys reference prior per speaker, i.e., a−=0.5× 22=11
and b−=0.5× 22=11 (hence m−=22). If we did not adjust the
relative strength of the priors in the numerator and denominator to
reflect the ratio of n− to n+ the results would be biased toward high
Bayes factor values. This is illustrated in Appendix A.
Plugging the chosen values for the hyperparameters (and the values
of n+ and n−) into Eq. (4) results in Eq. (5). Eq. (5) gives the equation
for calculating the Bayes factor value for each listener's claimed re-
cognition of each speaker. Eq. (5) is specific to the present study, Eq. (4)
is the general equation.
= = + ++ + = ++ ×
= ++ ×
++++
+ + +
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c n
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0.5
11
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7
0.5
11
22
c
n
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n
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1
11
22
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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2.8. Comments on the evidence and hypotheses considered
Although some listeners gave the names of some speakers who did
not contribute stimuli, Bayes factor values were only calculated for
speakers who actually contributed stimuli. Our lineup procedure is not
a database-search procedure designed to suggest candidates that may
warrant further investigation, i.e., to suggest potential suspects.
Instead, a suspect has already been identified and the purpose is to
evaluate the strength of evidence associated with a listener's claim to
have recognized the offender as the suspect. We are only interested in
Bayes factors for which the hypothesis in the numerator is that the
offender is a particular individual already designated as the suspect. We
are not interested in Bayes factors for which the hypothesis in the nu-
merator is that the speaker is some particular speaker other than the
suspect, e.g., some other speaker that the listener may happen to name
during the lineup. In an actual case there is usually only one suspect,
but for the purpose of demonstrating the method we treat each speaker
who contributed stimuli as a suspect, and thus calculate a Bayes factor
for each speaker who contributed stimuli.
One could calculate Bayes factors for other evidence and other hy-
potheses. For example:
• the evidence could be that the listener did not recognize the of-
fender, and the hypothesis in the numerator could be that the of-
fender is a designated speaker who is familiar to the listener; or• the evidence could be that the listener did not recognize the of-
fender, and the hypothesis in the numerator could be that the of-
fender is a speaker who is not known to the listener; or• the evidence could be that the listener claimed to recognize the
offender as a particular speaker who is familiar to the listener, and
the hypothesis in the numerator could be that the offender is a de-
signated speaker who is the brother of the speaker whom the listener
named.
For simplicity, in the present study we only examine Bayes factors
that answer the question: What is the probability that the listener would
say a designated familiar speaker's name if the recording they heard
was of that speaker, versus what is the probability that the listener
would say the designated speaker's name if the recording they heard
was of some other speaker from the relevant population? The other
speakers who contributed stimuli were intended to represent the po-
pulation of adult male Chilean Spanish speakers.
3. Results
Table 2 provides the raw counts of the number of times each listener
responded with each speaker's name. Results are only shown for
speakers who contributed stimuli. Speakers 101 through 105 were fa-
culty members familiar to the listeners, Speakers 201 through 205 were
unfamiliar speakers, and Speakers 301 through 315 were famous people
familiar to the listeners. In each cell, the number to the left of the
vertical bar is the number of times that the listener responded with the
speaker's name when the stimulus was a recording of that speaker, and
the number to the right of the vertical bar is the number of times that
the listener responded with the speaker's name when the stimulus was
not a recording of that speaker. If the former is greater than the latter
the text in the cell is blue, if the latter is greater than the former the text
in the cell is red (see the electronic version of the present paper for
color). The cell is blank if both values are zero. If one value is non-zero,
the cell contains numbers and has a white background. If both values
are non-zero, the cell contains numbers and has a gray background.
Values pooled across all speakers and pooled across all listeners are
provided on the margins of the table. The bottom row (labelled “total
resp.”) gives the total number of responses from each speaker, including
responses that were the names of speakers who did not contribute sti-
muli.
Table 3 shows the Bayes factor values corresponding to the counts
given in Table 2. Integers and fractions with integers in the denomi-
nator are exact values. Other values are given to one decimal place. For
Bayes factor values greater than 1 the text is blue, and for Bayes factor
values less than 1 the text is red (see the electronic version of the
present paper for color). All other formatting of Table 3 is the same as
for Table 2. Trivially, the Bayes factor value for each blank cell is 1.
These cells correspond to combinations of listener and speaker for
which the listener never gave the speaker's name.
4. Discussion
4.1. Bayes factor results per speaker per listener
The most obvious observation on the results is that most combina-
tions of listeners and speakers did not produce any responses, either
correct or incorrect. Of 4278 opportunities to give a response (6 sec-
tions× 23 speakers× 31 listeners), or 3348 opportunities excluding
the 5 unfamiliar speakers, there were only 185 responses total (in-
cluding 33 responses that were names of speakers who did not con-
tribute stimuli). Given the short recordings with poor audio conditions
it appears to have been very difficult for the listeners to recognize the
speakers.
Of the 18 familiar speakers, only 7 were correctly recognized at
least once by at least one of the 31 listeners. Only 2 speakers were ever
correctly recognized by more than two listeners. Speaker 104 was
correctly recognized at least once by 7 listeners and Speaker 105 was
correctly recognized at least once by 17 listeners. Both of these familiar
speakers were faculty members rather than famous people. A potential
explanation for why these speakers were correctly recognized at a
higher rate is that they could have been more familiar to the listeners
than the other speakers. Another potential explanation is that they
could have distinctive voices, i.e., voices that would be atypical with
respect to the rest of the population that listeners are used to hearing
(and in this case potentially atypical with respect to the other speakers
who contributed stimuli). In the first author's judgment, both these
speakers have atypical voices. Speaker 104, in particular, has a high-
pitched voice. Previous research on unfamiliar speaker identification
has found that atypical speakers are easier to recognize, e.g., [39], al-
though speakers who are atypical in the same way (e.g., both have the
same accent that is atypical from the perspective of the listeners) are
more likely to be confused with each other, e.g., [40]. In [41] an
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Table 2
Raw counts of the number of times each listener responded with each speaker's name. See main text for further explanation.
listeners
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 all
sp
ea
ke
rs
101 0|1 0|1 0|1 6|10 6|13
102 0|2 0|2
103
104 3|0 2|0 5|0 3|0 2|0 1|0 6|0 22|0
105 2|0 1|0 2|0 2|0 5|4 2|0 2|0 6|2 3|0 5|0 1|0 5|1 5|0 5|5 1|0 6|26 5|1 58|39
201
202
203
204
205
301 2|0 2|0
302
303 1|0 1|0
304
305 2|1 2|1
306
307
308 1|0 2|0 3|0
309
310
311
312
313 0|1 0|1 0|1 0|3
all 2|0 4|0 2|0 2|0 5|4 2|0 4|0 11|2 3|0 3|0 0|1 0|1 1|1 7|0 3|1 0|1 5|2 7|0 6|7 3|1 1|0 18|36 5|1 94|58
total resp. 2 0 5 0 2 2 9 2 1 4 13 3 3 1 2 1 5 8 0 4 3 7 0 7 14 15 1 0 65 0 6 185
Table 3
Bayes factors based on the number of times each listener responded with each speaker's name. See main text for further explanation.
listeners
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
sp
ea
ke
rs
101 1/1.1 1/1.1 1/1.1 6.8
102 1/1.2
103
104 7 5 11 7 5 3 13
105 5 3 5 5 8.1 5 5 11 7 11 3 10.1 11 7.6 3 3.9 10.1
201
202
203
204
205
301 5
302
303 3
304
305 4.6
306
307
308 3 5
309
310
311
312
313 1/1.1 1/1.1 1/1.1
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unfamiliar speaker was mistakenly identified as a familiar speaker; both
speakers had the same accent, and that accent was atypical from the
perspective of the listeners.
In addition to variation related to speakers, there was also variation
related to listeners: 6 listeners gave no responses at all, 21 gave less
than 10 responses, 3 gave 10–15 responses, and 1 gave 65 responses.
We have no explanation for why the latter listener (Listener 29) gave so
many responses compared to the other listeners. A large number of
Listener 29's responses were false alarms, but this listener was the only
listener to have Bayes factors greater than 1 for more than two speakers.
Listener 29 gave 6 correct Speaker 104 responses out of 6 oppor-
tunities and 0 incorrect Speaker 104 responses out of 132 opportunities.
This resulted in a Bayes factor value of 13, which was the largest Bayes
factor value for any listener's claimed recognition of any speaker. The
constrained magnitude of the Bayes factor is appropriate since large
values cannot be justified from small samples (see discussion in
[42,43]). Calculating a Bayes factor using (relatively) uninformative
priors is a way to take account of the sample size and constrain the
magnitude of the result accordingly. If we had used a larger sample size,
specifically more stimuli per speaker, we could potentially have ob-
tained higher Bayes factor values. For actual application we would
advise using more stimuli per speaker if possible (and a smaller number
of speakers).
Given the large variation across speakers and listeners, it appears
that it would not in general be safe to attempt to predict the strength of
evidence associated with any particular listener's claimed recognition of
any designated speaker based on results from any other combination of
speaker and listener. How well a listener performs on other speakers
would not be a good predictor, and (with the potential exception of
Speakers 104 and 105) how well other listeners perform on a speaker
would not be a good predictor.
There has been discussion in recent years of the issue of the preci-
sion of likelihood ratios. In Appendix B we discuss this issue in relation
to the results of the present study.
4.2. Bayes factor results for groups of listeners
In the original case there were several listeners, so in such a scenario
calculating a Bayes factor for a group of listeners' claimed recognitions
would be appropriate for quantifying the strength of evidence. If mul-
tiple earwitnesses claim to recognize an offender then that could po-
tentially correspond to a greater strength of evidence than if a single
listener claims to recognize the offender.
One has to be clear about what would constitute the evidence (note
the discussion on evidence and hypotheses in §1.3 and §2.8). If there
were three earwitnesses total and all three independently claimed to
recognize the offender as the suspect, then that is what would constitute
the evidence. If two of the earwitnesses independently claimed to re-
cognize the offender as the suspect and the third earwitness in-
dependently claimed not to recognize the offender, then that is what
would constitute the evidence. If all three earwitnesses conferred and
made a consensus claim of recognition, then that is what would con-
stitute the evidence.
It would, in principle, be possible to calculate Bayes factors for each
of the examples of evidence given above. If earwitnesses conferred on
the claimed recognition of the offender then the lineup design would
also have them confer and the counts would be the results of the group
consensus. Note that strength of evidence should not be calculated
using counts pooled from multiple listeners who independently re-
sponded to the lineup; such a calculation would not relate to any pos-
sible evidence.
For simplicity, in the present paper we only calculate a Bayes factor
for the first example given above: There are three earwitnesses total and
each of them independently claimed to recognize the offender as the
suspect; they had no opportunity to confer. For illustrative purposes we
pick Speaker 105 as the designated speaker and Listeners 06, 07, and 11
as the three listeners. We assume that each of the three listeners has
independently recognized a recording of the offender as the suspect (a
recording of the offender included in the lineup or in a showup), or each
heard the offender speaking during the commission of the crime and
independently recognized the offender as the suspect. Note the re-
cording of the offender should not be confused with recordings of the
suspect. Since each listener independently claimed to recognize the
offender as the suspect, we use naïve Bayes fusion and simply multiply
together the Bayes factor values that were independently calculated for
each listener, hence the resulting Bayes factor value is the product of
the three values from Table 3: × × =5 8.06 11 433. 6.
4.3. Implementation issues
In the present study the audio conditions were so poor that a priori
we did not consider it necessary to select speakers who sounded par-
ticularly similar to each other. Under better audio conditions, it would
be necessary to follow the procedures used for unfamiliar-speaker-
identification lineups and select foil speakers who sound similar to the
target speaker. Foil speakers could be a mixture of speakers who are
familiar to the listener(s), and speakers who are unfamiliar to the lis-
tener(s). Different protocols for unfamiliar-speaker-identification
lineups suggest using between 5 and 8 foils. Such speakers are not
theoretically necessarily difficult to find, as relatives or friends from a
close social group may sound similar to the suspect. To further distract
the listener(s) and reduce the potential for bias, we would recommend
including multiple other familiar speakers, and foil speakers who sound
similar to the other familiar speakers. To serve this purpose, those other
familiar speakers would not necessarily have to sound particularly si-
milar to the suspect, although it would reduce the burden elsewhere if
they did. To avoid introducing a bias, if the other familiar speakers do
not sound particularly similar to the suspect, the number of similar-
sounding foils for each of the other familiar speakers should be (at least
approximately) the same as for the suspect. If the other familiar
speakers do not sound similar to the suspect then it would be appro-
priate for n− to be based on the number of foils that sound similar to the
suspect rather than on the total number of speakers in the lineup.
As we mentioned in §4.1, if possible, we would advise using more
stimuli per speaker (and probably a smaller number of speakers) than
were used in the listening experiment reported in the present paper.
This would potentially allow for Bayes factor values that are further
from 1.
A serious practical (and potentially legal) problem arises in that to
run the lineup we would need to obtain recordings of the suspect under
conditions that reflect those of the case. Cooperation may not be
forthcoming and may not be compellable at all or not compellable in
such a way as to obtain the required recording conditions. It may also in
practice be difficult to obtain recordings of other speakers who sound
similar to the suspect and/or who are familiar to the listeners.
The difficulty of obtaining recordings of the suspect (and recordings
of other speakers) under conditions that reflect those of the case could
be mitigated if it is possible to obtain high-quality audio recordings
under other circumstances (e.g., during an interview). It may then be
possible to process the high-quality recordings in order to obtain con-
ditions that reflect those of the case, e.g., in the present study rather
than have the famous speakers sit in the car, high-quality recordings of
them were played through a loudspeaker placed in the car.
The practical difficulties associated with unfamiliar-speaker-identi-
fication lineups are such that in some jurisdictions they are not often
used, [10]. The practical difficulties associated with the familiar-
speaker-recognition lineup method proposed in the present paper are
somewhat greater. It is therefore unlikely that the proposed method will
be used frequently, but it may be worth using in a small number of
important cases in which the strength of evidence associated with the
familiar-speaker recognition is pivotal.
If a recording of the offender is available, as one was in the original
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case, then we would recommend performing a forensic voice compar-
ison analysis instead. The process of training/optimizing and empiri-
cally validating a forensic voice comparison under conditions that re-
flect those of the case would face some, but not all, of the practical
challenges that would be encountered in setting up a speaker lineup. A
forensic voice comparison system based on relevant data quantitative
measurements, and statistical models, with direct reporting of the
output of the model, would be intrinsically much more resistant to
cognitive bias.
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Appendix A. Effect of not adjusting the prior to take account of the ratio of n− to n+
In the calculation of the numerators of the Bayes factors in the present study n+=6 but in the calculation of the denominators n−=132. If we
did not adjust the relative strength of the priors in the numerator and denominator to reflect the ratio of n− to n+ the results would be biased toward
high Bayes factor values. For example, if c1+ and c1− were both 0, then the calculated Bayes factor value should be 1. If, however, a+, b+, a−, and
b− were all set to 0.5 (hence m+ and m− would both be 1), substituting these values into Eq. (4) would give a calculated Bayes factor value of 19 (see
Eq. (6a)). Likewise, c1+/n+=1/6 and c1−/n−=22/132= 1/6 should result in a calculated Bayes factor value of 1, but using priors of
a+= b+= a−= b−=0.5 would result in a calculated Bayes factor value of 1.26 (see Eq. (6b)).
= =+++ +
( )
( )
133
7
19
0 0.5
6 1
0 0.5
132 1 (6a)
= ×× = =
++++
( )
( )
1.5 133
7 22.5
199.5
157.5
1.26
1 0.5
6 1
22 0.5
132 1 (6b)
In contrast, adjusting the hyperparameter values to reflect the ratio of n− to n+ as described in §2.7, i.e., a+= b+=0.5 (hence m+=1) but
a−= b−=11 (hence m−=22), leads to the correct results (see Eq. (7a) and (7b)).
= ×× = =
++++
( )
( )
0.5 154
7 11
77
77
1
0 0.5
6 1
0 11
132 22 (7a)
= ×× = =
++++
( )
( )
1.5 154
7 33
231
231
1
1 0.5
6 1
22 11
132 22 (7b)
Appendix B. Precision
In recent years there has been discussion of the issue of precision of likelihood ratios, including in a virtual special issue on the topic in Science &
Justice: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/science-and-justice/special-issue/102F0FGVD03
For at least some subjectivist Bayesians the idea that there could be imprecision in Bayes factor values is anathema, e.g., Taroni et al. [44] and
Berger & Slooten [45]. More moderate voices, e.g., Ommen et al. [46], have pointed out that when calculations result in an approximate Bayes factor
value (e.g., via Monte Carlo integration), then it would be appropriate to report an estimate of the error due to the numerical technique. The purpose
of reporting the estimate of the error would be to decide whether the calculation method was sufficiently precise to go ahead and use the calculated
Bayes factor value, not to report a coverage interval or adjust the reported Bayes factor value according to a coverage interval (see also Taylor et al.
[47] on sensitivity).
The “objective” Bayesian approach we have adopted in the present paper makes use of “uninformative” priors which leads to Bayes factor
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quantifications of strength of evidence that are closer to 1 than would result from maximum-likelihood estimates of likelihood ratio values, thus
addressing what may be the underlying concern related to precision of quantifications of strength of evidence: avoiding overstating strength of
evidence (see Vergeer et al. [42] and Morrison & Poh [43]). The approach we have adopted has a closed-form solution so numerical imprecision per
se is not an issue. In this appendix, however, we do explore the question of whether the precision of the method is good enough to report and use the
calculated point-value Bayes factor values. We follow the general procedure described in van den Hout & Alberink [48] for estimating the posterior
distribution of the likelihood ratio. The Bayes factor is the ratio of the expected value of the posterior beta distribution of θ+ and the expected value
of the posterior beta distribution of θ−. Each of the latter expected values are obtained by integrating out θ+ and θ− respectively, see Eq. (3) and Eq.
(4). To estimate the posterior distribution of the likelihood ratio, rather than integrating out θ+ and θ−, we independently draw a Monte Carlo
sample + and a Monte Carlo sample from the respective posterior beta distributions, and calculate an estimate of the posterior likelihood ratio LR∗
as in Eq. (8). We repeat this for 1 million pairs of independently drawn samples, and plot the histogram of the resulting log10(LR∗) values.
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Fig. 1. Example posterior beta distributions for θ+ and θ− (left panel, blue and red curves respectively), and Monte Carlo estimate of the posterior distribution of the
likelihood ratio LR∗ (right panel). Example corresponds to the largest Bayes factor value obtained from the data (dashed line). (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 2. Example posterior beta distributions for θ+ and θ− (left panel, blue and red curves respectively), and Monte Carlo estimate of the posterior distribution of the
likelihood ratio LR∗ (right panel). Example corresponds to a moderate Bayes factor value obtained from the data (dashed line). (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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= +LR (8)
Figs. 1 through 4 show examples based on counts found in selected cells in Table 2. These counts and their corresponding Bayes factor values
(from Table 3) are repeated in Table 4. Fig. 1 corresponds to the largest Bayes factor value obtained from the data, Fig. 2 to a moderate Bayes factor
value, Fig. 3 to the smallest Bayes factor value greater than 1, and Fig. 4 to the smallest Bayes factor value obtained from the data. The left panels
show the posterior beta distributions for the numerator (θ+) and denominator (θ−). The vertical dashed lines give the analytical expected values for
these distributions, + and as calculated using Eq. (3). The right panels show the histograms from the Monte Carlo estimate of the posterior
distribution of the likelihood ratio, the posterior distribution for LR∗. The x-axis is scaled as log10(LR∗), and extends to the lowest and highest values
calculated from the Monte Carlo samples (or to 0 if that is a more extreme value). A solid vertical line is drawn at log10(LR∗)= 0, and a dashed
vertical line is drawn at the Bayes factor value calculated analytically using Eq. (5). Note that the axes are rescaled in each panel and figure. This
better displays the data within each figure and panel, but should be taken into account when visually comparing across figures.
• For Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, corresponding to Bayes factors of 13 and 8.1 respectively, the precision of the posterior distribution of the likelihood ratio is
good: the spread of the distribution is relatively narrow. We would decide that the precision on the method is good enough for it to be used in
these instances.• For Fig. 3, corresponding to a Bayes factor of 3, the precision of the posterior distribution of the likelihood ratio is poorer: the spread of the
distribution is relatively wide. This is a borderline case as to whether we would decide that the precision of the method is good enough in this
instance.• For Fig. 4, corresponding to a Bayes factor of 1/1.2, the precision of the posterior distribution of the likelihood ratio is very poor: the spread of the
distribution is very wide. We would decide that the precision on the method is not good enough for it to be used in this instance.
Since the Bayes factor values associated with Figs. 3 and 4 are close to 1 anyway, deciding that the precision on the method is not good enough
for it to be used in these instances would be no great loss. The values are close to 1 because the Bayes factor calculations were designed to take
account of concerns regarding precision of strength of evidence / concerns regarding overstating strength of evidence.
Note that in this appendix we have only explored imprecision due to the posterior beta distributions. We have not considered imprecision due to
sampling variability or sensitivity to choice of priors.
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Fig. 3. Example posterior beta distributions for θ+ and θ− (left panel, blue and red curves respectively), and Monte Carlo estimate of the posterior distribution of the
likelihood ratio LR∗ (right panel). Example corresponds to the smallest Bayes factor value greater than 1 obtained from the data (dashed line). (For interpretation of
the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Example counts and Bayes factors corresponding to posterior likelihood ratio distributions shown in Figs. 1 through 4.
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1 104 29 6 0 0 132 13
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3 105 03 1 5 0 132 3
4 102 25 0 6 2 130 1/1.2
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